Unintended consequences of a pre-announced climate policy have been studied in a variety of situations. We show that early announcement of a carbon tax gives rise to a "Green-Paradox," in that it increases polluting emissions in the interim period (between announcement and actual implementation), irrespective of the scarcity of fossil fuels. The phenomenon holds both when the announced implementation date is taken as a credible threat and when households are skeptical about the (political) will or capability of the government to implement the policy as announced. The paradoxical outcome is driven by consumptionsaving tradeoffs facing households who seek to smooth consumption over time.
Introduction
Climate policy making is complex because costs and benefits are uncertain, arise at different points of an extended time span, and fall on different countries and generations.
Nevertheless, it is generally felt undesirable to postpone action until all complexities are sorted out. A way to deal with the complexities is to announce polices well ahead of their implementation, in order to give involved parties a chance to prepare their compliance with the regulation.
Two main problems are associated with such an "announce-in-advance" approach to policy making, namely the "leakage effect" and the "announcement effect". The first arises when participation and coverage of the policy are incomplete. If not all of the polluting sectors or countries are subject to the policy, the response of unregulated sectors and countries could undo some of the pollution reductions in the regulated sectors and countries. The leakage effect may be partial (emission reduction in one country is partly offset by increased emission in other countries), it may be negative, i.e., with reduced emission also in the unregulated countries [see 1, 4] , and it can be positive, i.e., give rise to an increased overall emission (the reduction of regulated countries is more than offset by increases in unregulated countries). The latter case is referred to as the green paradox [see, for example 7, 5] .
The announcement effect corresponds to actions taken by affected parties immediately after the announcement and before the policy is implemented. Two types of announcement effects may occur. The favorable type occurs when polluters start abating pollution and accumulating credits, partly because it is less costly to spread abatement over time rather than concentrate efforts at a short period. The unfavorable type -vis-à-vis the intention to reduce emission -occurs when firms increase emission. They might have stocks of polluting inputs that they would like to quickly use before they are no longer allowed to do so. More subtly, but essentially through the same mechanism, the total stock of polluting resources might be inelastic in supply, because a nonrenewable resource like oil, gas, or coal is involved. This is why an announcement of carbon taxation may induce resource owners to lower prices and induce users to burn more fossil fuels. This mechanism is studied in [3] . Its robustness vis-à-vis the presence of different types of backstop resources (cheap or expensive, clean or polluting) is considered in [9] .
In this work we study unfavorable effects of announcing a carbon tax well in advance.
In particular, we show how the announcement entails an increase in the use of fossil energy until the implementation date. Our approach deviates from the existing literature in three main ways. First, we abstract from scarcity of energy resources, i.e. there is no stock of energy resources that owners are eager to deplete. While the papers cited above all rely on the scarcity of the polluting input to generate the paradoxical announcement effect, we show that scarcity is not required. This situation seems relevant to abundant resources like coal for which the scarcity rent is likely to be very small. Second, we account for the consumption-saving decisions made by households and for the effect of capital stock on energy demand. We thus pay attention also to the dynamics at the energy demand side, rather than focusing on the supply side. The build-up of capital is time-consuming so that investment behavior is forward looking.
When the climate policy is announced, investment responds and the change in capacity affects energy demand before the climate policy is implemented. The existing literature typically assumes the resource stock to be the only predetermined stock variable [e.g. 6]. Abstracting from resource scarcity allows us to focus on other investment decisions without losing tractability.
Third, we allow for a competition between conventional (dirty) and alternative (clean) energy technologies. We show that the timing and technological opportunities of these are crucial in determining the paradoxical announcement effects. In doing so we extend the model of [8] , which investigates the incentives to build up solar energy capacity, to the situation of pre-announced policies. The more general interpretation is that we deal with investment in productive capacity as well as equipment and knowledge capital for abatement and alternative energy supply. We show that, depending on the relative cost of both types of investment, a green policy announcement may paradoxically result in increased emissions during the interim period.
The conventional view underlying the early announcement of a climate policy is that, if firms start investing in abatement capital or alternative energy supply in anticipation of the implementation of the policy, pollution falls because of the announcement. However, our model suggests that the paradoxical result of increased pollution is more likely. To show this, we assume in Section 3 that the policy takes the form of announcing that a carbon tax will be implemented at some future date. At the time of implementation, energy use falls so that output is lower. Since households want to smooth consumption, there is a rationale for accelerating investment early on, giving rise to a larger capital stock. The accumulation of capital raises the demand for energy before implementation since capital and energy are (imperfect) complements as factors of production. Thus, announcing a policy aimed at reducing the use of fossil energy well in advance gives rise to the opposite effect until the policy is actually realized. The result holds both when the regulation policy involves a mild tax rate which reduces fossil use but does not induce the use of alternative, clean (solar) energy as well as when the tax rate is high enough to trigger a transition to solar energy.
In section 4 we extend the results by considering uncertainty as yet another driver of paradoxical effects. We incorporate uncertainty into the model by assuming that the government announces the intention to levy the carbon tax, but the date of implementation depends on political conditions and is therefore uncertain. The distinction appears to be important as it affects the underlying mechanism that drives the paradox. In particular, the continuity of the consumption process plays a key role in deriving the early announcement effect when the implementation date is known with certainty. In contrast, under uncertain implementation date, the consumption path undergoes a discontinuous jump at the (random) implementation date. Nevertheless, we establish the "green paradox" also under uncertainty, and show that it is driven by the same economic forces: anticipating that the tax will reduce energy use in the future induces households to enhance saving today in order to accumulate more capital that can substitute for the lower energy input.
Prior to implementation of the tax policy, the increased capital stock is associated with increased energy input, hence the paradoxical outcome. Indeed, since uncertainty regarding implementation appears to be a common feature characterizing climate policies, the negative effect of the paradox may be significant.
Of course, saving (capital accumulation) comes at the expense of consumption, and the realization of the paradoxical effect depends on a condition relating the production elasticity of capital to the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. This condition holds in any empirically relevant calibration and the paradoxical early announcement effect appears to be robust.
Competitive allocation
We build on the framework of Tsur and Zemel [8] , who analyzed the penetration of solar technologies in a competitive economy. In subsection 2.1 we briefly describe the competitive (unregulated) economy and summarize the relevant properties characterizing it. In subsections 2.2 and 2.3 we extend the framework to better suit the present focus regarding early-announcement-green-paradox phenomena.
The economy and energy tradeoffs
The economy consists of a final good sector, an energy sector and households that own capital and labor. The final good is produced by capital, energy and labor inputs via a constant-returns-to-scale technology, represented by the per-capita production function y(·, ·) of per-capita capital k and per-capita energy x, satisfying, for k > 0 and x > 0, the standard properties:
In (2.1), the subscripts k and x signify partial derivatives with respect to these inputs.
Energy sector
The energy sector consists of fossil energy firms and solar energy firms. The cost of solar energy is therefore solely due to the capital cost. The two sources of energy are perfect substitutes, thus
where x f stands for the fossil energy supply rate. 
where ι(t) is the investment rate in solar capital and δ > 0 is a depreciation rate.
Final good firms
So long as fossil energy is used, the competitive energy firms drive the energy price to the marginal cost of fossil energy supply ζ. At this price, final good firms demand energy up to the level at which the value of its marginal product equals the energy price:
The demand for capital is set at the level where the value of its marginal product equals the price of capital -the interest rate. At each point of time t, the equilibrium interest rate equates the capital demand and capital supply, where the latter is determined by households' saving decisions.
Households

At time t, the representative household's wealth equals k(t) + s(t), yielding the income y(k(t), x f (t) + bs(t)) − ζx f (t). This income is used for final good consumption, c(t), and saving (gross wealth increase),k(t) + δk(t) +ṡ(t) + δs(t).
Thus, the household budget constraint at time t is
which, noting (2.3), can be expressed aṡ
The household derives felicity from consumption according to a strictly concave and increasing instantaneous utility function u(·) and seeks the consumption-saving policy that maximizes
subject to the budget constraint (2.5), taking parametrically the final good firms decisions (2.4) and the solar firms investment policy, where ρ is the pure (utility) rate of discount.
Equilibrium
In a perfect-foresight, competitive equilibrium, the expectations of all participants are fulfilled and no party has an incentive to alter decisions. The competitive (equilibrium) allocation is characterized in Tsur and Zemel [8] . We summarize the salient properties of the competitive allocation, making use of the following notation:
is the critical fossil energy price which just equals the imputed cost of the solar capital required to produce one power unit at a capital price (interest rate) ρ + δ;
is the energy input demanded by final good firms with capital stock k when the energy price is ζ, i.e., the energy input x that satisfies (2.4). Under assumption (2.1),
Thus, in a competitive allocation, energy input increases with the stock k. This intuitive property underlies the "paradoxical" outcome derived below.
It is verified in Tsur and Zemel [8] that investing simultaneously in both final good capital k and solar capital s can be optimal only when the values of their marginal products are equal, i.e., when
The by x term on the right hand side represents the marginal return to solar capital: an additional unit of solar capital allows for the saving of b units of fossil energy with the marginal product y x . The marginal product of capital y k on the left hand side represents the opportunity cost of solar investment.
It is also verified (op. cit.) that in a steady state, wherek =ṡ = 0, the condition 
Noting (2.4) and (2.10), k m (ζ) marks the lowest k level at which investment in solar capital is worthwhile.
We now describe how the solar-based economy evolves over time. To that end, it is expedient to introduce the wealth variable
and its particular threshold level
14)
The characterization in [8] of the solar-based processes is summarized in:
Proposition 2. The competitive processes of solar-based economies (with ζ > ζ c ) evolve along the following three consecutive phases:
Fossil Phase: While w(t) < k m (ζ), only fossil energy is used at the rate x f (t) =
X(k(t), ζ) and no investment in solar energy is undertaken (s(t) = 0).
Mixed Phase: While k m (ζ) ≤ w(t) < w ms (ζ), both fossil and solar energy are used simultaneously with k(t) fixed at k m (ζ), w(t) = k m (ζ) + s(t) and solar energy gradually replacing fossil energy:
Solar Phase: While w(t) ≥ w ms (ζ), no fossil energy is used (x f (t) = 0) and both types of capital grow simultaneously towards the steady state.
During the final, solar phase both k and s grow simultaneously and the arbitrage condition (2.10) implies that solar capital equals the function S(w) defined, implicitly, by the relation
From (2.15) we deduce, using assumption (2.1), that The intuition behind proposition 2 is similar to that behind the previous proposition.
Starting with a low initial capital stock, the return to investing in k is larger than the 
The GDP function
Further insight can be gained by introducing the maximized value added (or GDP) function: Moreover, the function decreases with ζ:
During the mixed phase, while
, and the GDP function is linear in wealth w. To see this, let
and use (2.14) to write
Thus, G w (w, ζ) = bζ > 0 and G ww (w, ζ) = 0.
During the solar phase, while w(t) > w ms (ζ) and x f (t) = 0, the GDP function, expressed in terms of S(w) of (2.15), assumes the form
which is independent of ζ, since this price is irrelevant for production and investment decisions when fossil energy is no longer used. Using (2.10), we find that G w (w, ζ) = y k (w − S(w), bS(w)) > 0, while (2.16) and assumption (2.1) imply
Thus, the GDP function increases with w at a diminishing marginal rate.
We summarize the above discussion in:
Lemma 2.1. The GDP function can be expressed as The GDP function, thus, resembles a neoclassical production function, albeit with a constant marginal product of (total) capital during the mixed phase. The latter property arises because investment during the mixed phase amounts to installing solar capacity in order to replace fossil fuels, which have a fixed marginal product y x = ζ. Thus, the return to investment equals the savings in fossil fuel cost which are constant per unit of investment.
The GDP function G and the return to capital G ′ are depicted in Figure 1 as functions of total wealth w along the three phases. 3 Note that the linear branch of the mixed phase joins smoothly the curves corresponding to the fossil and solar phases. Note further, in the lower panel, that when ρ + δ exceeds bζ, it equals the return to capital G ′ at some state w < k m , i.e. along the fossil phase, hence the steady state must be fossil based (cf.
equation (2.23) below)
. In contrast, when ρ + δ < bζ, the steady state condition holds in the solar phase, giving rise to a solar based economy.
Dynamic characterization via the GDP function
Adding (2.3) and (2.5) giveṡ w(t) = G(w(t), ζ) − δw(t) − c(t). (2.19)
Let V (w|ζ) = max subject to (2.19), given w(0) = w < k m (ζ) and a constant fossil price ζ. Using (2.18) it can be shown that:
Lemma 2.2. The consumption and wealth processes, c(·) and w(·), corresponding to (2.20) equal the competitive consumption and total capital processes, c(·) and k(·) + s(·), characterized in Propositions 1-2.
The proof entails comparing the solution of (2.20) with the competitive processes characterized in the Propositions and is omitted. In fact, the necessary conditions for (2.20) specify the dynamics of the consumption process aṡ
c(t) = c(t)σ(c(t))[G w (w(t), ζ)
where
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consumption grows in proportion to the difference between the net return to investment G w − δ and the time preference rate ρ.
The boundary conditions include the initial capital w 0 and the steady state levelsŵ(ζ) andĉ(ζ), satisfyingċ =ẇ = 0, which are obtained from:
In (2.24),
is the capital elasticity of the GDP function, or "capital share" for short.
4
Since the system of differential equations (2.19) and (2.21) is autonomous, c can be expressed as a function of w. Taking the time derivative of c(w) and using (2.19), (2.21) and (2.25) we obtain 
19) to find w(t), implicitly, from
, t > 0.
The time trajectory of consumption is then given by c(w(t)).
Early announcement paradox
The discussion so far ignores the externalities associated with fossil energy due, e.g.
to polluting emissions. A common policy addressing such externalities entails taxing emissions. In the present setting, such a policy is equivalent to increasing the fossil energy price ζ. We call such price increase "carbon tax" and denote it by τ . If the tax is imposed abruptly, the economy will respond promptly by switching from the competitive allocation corresponding to the initial (low) price ζ l to the allocation associated with the higher price ζ h = ζ l + τ . Imposing such a policy by surprise entails discontinuities in the consumption-saving processes and is unlikely to score high in public opinion polls.
Policymakers, then, opt to announce the tax policy well ahead of its actual implementation in order to allow gradual adjustments to the forthcoming changes.
We show that the early announcement gives rise to an effect akin to the green paradox, whereby the use of fossil energy will actually increase, rather than decrease, during the intermediate period between the announcement of the tax policy and its actual implementation. We assume that initially (without the carbon tax) the economy is fossil-based, i.e., ζ l < ζ c (otherwise, no intervention is needed) and show that the result holds both when the after-tax economy remains fossil-based and when it switches to the solar-based type. In the latter case, we assume that the economy remains at the fossil phase until the tax implementation date T .
We use the superscripts l and h to denote competitive allocation processes under ζ = ζ l and ζ = ζ l + τ ≡ ζ h , respectively. The allocation processes corresponding to the early announcement policy, with ζ = ζ l until some known time T and ζ h = ζ l + τ thereafter, are indicated by the superscript r. The latter are the result of The early announcement paradox is a direct consequence of the announcement-induced decline in consumption (see Figure 2 and the appendix for a proof):
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the final good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Then, c r (w) < c l (w) prior to the implementation date T .
Note that the result is purely an announcement effect: The two consumption processes proceed under the same (low) fossil energy price and the same production technology (both are based entirely on fossil energy). The difference between c l (w) and c r (w) stems from the fact that the former is determined under the expectation that fossil energy will remain cheap, whereas the latter is carried out under the expectation that the price of fossil energy will increase at time T . Moreover, the comparison in Lemma 3.1 applies also when the after-tax price is high enough to change the economy into a solar-based type.
(In this case, however, the comparison is restricted to the fossil phase of the regulated process.) Indeed, it is not a particular post-tax behavior that drives the effect but rather the anticipated reduction in fossil energy use.
The Cobb-Douglas specification (3.2) is not essential and is used here merely to simplify the analysis. In contrast, the elasticity condition The consumption relation of Lemma 3.1 entails the opposite relation for the corresponding capital processes. To see this, note, using (2.19) , that the time trajectories of w j , j = l, r, are given, implicitly, by
Thus, the relation c l (w) > c r (w) implies that, prior to implementation,
Moreover, during the the fossil phase w = k and the larger capital implies, noting (2.9), larger energy use
With energy being derived solely from fossil sources during the interim period, the early announcement actually increases the use of fossil energy, compared to the case in which no announcement is made. We summarize this property in:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the final good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Then, announcing that a carbon tax will be implemented T years from now increases the use of fossil energy in the interim period, prior to implementation, compared to the situation in which no announcement is made.
The Proposition manifests the paradoxical outcome in our setting. Anticipating the future increase in the price of fossil energy, households respond by reducing consumption and increasing saving in order to smooth consumption at the time of transition to the carbon tax regime. Higher saving rates imply larger capital stocks and enhanced energy demand, in contrast to the original purpose of the announced policy.
Uncertain implementation date
In the previous section we assumed that households know the carbon tax implementation date precisely and adjust their behavior so as to smooth consumption at the transition time, giving rise to the paradoxical outcome. Here we show that the paradox persists also when agents are skeptical about the government (political) capability or willingness to implement the policy as announced, and take the implementation date T to be uncertain. We confine attention to the case in which the economy is fossil-based both before and after the carbon tax is imposed.
Suppose that the implementation of the carbon tax τ , under which the price of fossil energy increases from ζ l to ζ h = ζ l + τ , is considered to take place at some unknown future date T . The realization of T may depend on the successful ratification and implementation of some international treaty, or on other developments in the global arena, and is taken as exogenous to the economy under consideration. Thus, from the vantage point of the economy, the hazard rate π corresponding to the random time T is constant.
The payoff, conditional on T , is
where V (w|ζ) is defined in (2.20).
A constant hazard π implies that T is exponentially distributed and the expected payoff is
The household problem with uncertain carbon tax implementation date becomes The capital process w π (·) follows (2.19) with ζ = ζ l (the prevailing low price until the tax is imposed) while equation (2.21) becomeṡ
where 
and
The following relation between c j (w), j = l, h, π, is established in the appendix:
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that the final good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Then, the relations
hold prior to the realization of the implementation date T .
Uncertainty, then, reduces consumption but not by as much as would be implied by a prompt implementation of the carbon tax.
We can use equation (3.4) again, with j = l, π, to obtain
which implies that
at each point of time prior to the realization of T . This establishes the early announcement paradox in the case of uncertain T . We summarize this result in While households are unable in this case to ensure a completely smooth consumption process at the uncertain implementation date, they can prepare for the carbon tax by increasing savings (i.e., accumulating a larger capital stock as compared to the situation where no carbon tax is anticipated) in order to use their larger wealth as a buffer to moderate discontinuous change in consumption when the carbon tax is eventually realized.
In the meantime, alas, the larger capital enhances the demand for fossil energy and the polluting emissions that come along with it.
Concluding comments
It is tempting to announce the intention to levy an emission tax at some later date in order to grant households and firms a "grace period" during which they can adjust to the forthcoming regime. This good intention turns out to be counterproductive, as it increases emissions during the interim period before the tax is implemented. This paradoxical outcome arises disregarding the scarcity of fossil fuels. Indeed, setting aside scarcity allows tracing the paradoxical outcome to delicate saving-consumption tradeoffs in household decisions, dominated by a condition relating the elasticities of (marginal utility of) consumption and of capital.
The paradoxical outcome stems from the households' desire to smooth consumption at the transition to the after-tax regime. Imposing the tax renders essential fossil energy inputs more expensive, which in turn decreases production and consumption. Anticipating these future effects, households reduce consumption and increase saving well before the tax is implemented, giving rise to a faster buildup of capital in order to mitigate the fall in energy use at the time the carbon tax is imposed. In the meantime, the larger capital entails a higher rate of fossil energy use. Actually, when the tax implementation time T is known with certainty, we find that the consumption process is continuous at T . This "consumption smoothing motive" is the driving force underlying the early announcement paradoxical outcome.
The paradoxical effect persists also when the carbon tax implementation time T is uncertain. While the economic forces at work are similar to those driving the early announcement effect under known T , the two mechanisms operate differently. Under uncertain T , households cannot predict the tax implementation date at which they should smooth the consumption process. In fact, consumption will undergo a discontinuous jump at this date and the adopted processes are tuned so as to minimize the expected utility loss associated with the jump. The solution involves delicate tradeoffs but the paradoxical effect of increased fossil energy use persists at all times until the tax policy is realized. According to (4.3), P (ŵ π ) is small when π is small, henceŵ π is close toŵ l and (4.5)
implies that
With u ′′ (·) < 0, it follows that u ′ (c π (ŵ π )) < u ′ (c h (ŵ π )) and P (ŵ π ) > 0. Turning again to (C.1) and noting (cf. Lemma 2.1) that G ww < 0, we find thatŵ π >ŵ l when the hazard
